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Abstract. We present Drac, a system designed to provide anonymity
and unobservability for real-time instant messaging and voice-over-IP
communications against a global passive adversary. The system uses a
relay based anonymization mechanism where circuits are routed over a
social network in a peer-to-peer fashion, using full padding strategies and
separate epochs to hide connection and disconnection events. Unlike es-
tablished systems, Drac gives away the identity of a user’s friends to guar-
antee the unobservability of actual calls, while still providing anonymity
when talking to untrusted third parties. We present the core design and
components of Drac, we discuss the key ways in which it challenges our
current concepts of anonymity and provide an initial simulation-based
security analysis.
1 Introduction
Anonymous communications are important since the addressing, timing and vol-
ume of traffic can in some cases leak as much information as its content [37].
This is particularly true for real-time communications, as instant messages or
phone calls can be indicative of imminent intentions or plans, e.g. in military
command and control systems, or sensitive personal information, like medical
status or family life, in civilian settings. Despite this, few systems have been
proposed to provide strong anonymity against global passive adversaries for pri-
vate communications.
Drac aims to provide strong anonymity and traffic analysis guarantees for
real-time communications. This is achieved though a peer-to-peer relay based
architecture. We assume that the traffic relayed is regular or low volume such as
voice-over-IP (VoIP) or instant messaging (IM) respectively. This allows us to
use a traffic padding regime and destroy any information leaking from patterns of
traffic. Communication sessions are started and ended synchronously to further
limit the information leakage.
We also design the trust model of Drac around a friend-of-a-friend archi-
tecture: communications between friends are unobservable, and communications
with further contacts in the network are anonymous. Despite the anonymity
sets being smaller, they are harder than random anonymity sets, in that they
are correlated between sessions and an adversary has to infiltrate the social cir-
cle of a user to perform insider attacks. Finally, we assume that both parties to
a conversation use Drac for their communications and have incentives to stay
on-line and relay third party traffic even when they are not communicating: this
provides unobservability [27] and is a natural architecture to support incoming
voice calls or instant messages.
The aim of this work is to introduce the Drac design and provide a pre-
liminary analysis of anonymity and unobservability. Unobservability is an un-
usual property, and even defining it or measuring it in a system represents
novel challenges. Three aspects of the system are studied though simulations:
the anonymity provided against the presence system, and the anonymity and
unobservability of communications towards a global passive adversary.
The paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 presents previous work and build-
ing blocks used in Drac; Sect. 3 presents a high level model of Drac and its
components; Sect. 4 shows the preliminary evaluation results; finally we discuss
some further aspects of Drac in Sect. 5 and offer our conclusions in Sect. 6.
2 Drac and related work
High-latency anonymous communications were introduced by David Chaum [6],
and have been implemented in deployed systems such as mixmaster [22] and
later mixminion [8]. Those systems are economical in that they do not require
cover traffic. On the downside, they delay communications significantly, making
it difficult to have a real-time conversation as is required for IM or VoIP.
Onion Routing systems, including Tor [13], provide low latency communica-
tions for web-browsing cheaply, by sacrificing security against a global passive
adversary. Yet such adversaries are realistic and can be implemented through
sampling [24], indirect network measurements [23], or eavesdropping on key Au-
tonomous Systems (AS) [15]. Web browsing loads are bursty and high-bandwidth
such that any traffic padding regime would be uneconomical. IM and VoIP loads
on the other hand are more regular, or simply low-bandwidth, allowing link and
end-to-end padding strategies to be affordable if high security is required.
The ISDN-mix system [26] was specifically designed to provide real-time
anonymous communications. As ISDN-mixes, Drac creates connections synchro-
nously in epochs to maintain connection anonymity, but does not implement
cascades and does not use the custom ISDN infrastructure to support its oper-
ation – instead we assume that the communications are taking place over IP,
using off-the-shelf routers.
In this work we are not overly concerned with the cryptographic details of
Drac. There exist well established, provably secure, cryptographic constructions
to support relaying anonymized messages [9] and extending anonymous connec-
tions [16, 18]. Similarly we assume that a padding regime is established that
makes the output channels traffic statistically independent of the input chan-
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nels [31, 34, 36]. This can be done simply by sampling a traffic schedule for the
output channel independently and before even seeing the input channels, and
sticking to it by adding cover traffic if there is not enough, or dropping messages
if the queues become too long.
The trust model Drac uses is a version of restricted routes [7], where paths
are created over friendship links. The impact of social networks on anonymity
has been studied before [12], and recent work [17] has looked at modifying the
global trust assumption common in contemporary anonymous channels. Yet we
are the first to propose boldly making use of a social network as the backbone
of anonymous paths.
Finally, the analysis we provide follows the information theoretic metrics
proposed in [30, 11]. The probabilistic analysis we perform is very much a first
analysis of the system, as it is heuristic, and does not take into account all con-
straints known to the adversary. A full Bayesian analysis [32] would be required
to do this, and is the subject of future work. A full analysis of the impact of long
term disclosure attacks [19] is also necessary: Drac is designed to provide smaller,
but harder anonymity sets, than other systems. The fact that anonymity sets
of different epochs are highly correlated (as routing is embedded over a social
graph) invalidates previous results and performance bounds of these attacks [25].
These models have so far assumed anonymity sets contain random users, whereas
in Drac these are highly correlated and composed of the social surroundings of
users.
3 The Drac system
At the core of Drac we have a social network formed by N users (or nodes.)
Each user ui in this social network is connected to a set of friends Fi. We
assume that friends have a strong trust relation, and that they use each other
to relay communications. For this purpose, friends share cryptographic keys (or
at least a weak secret to bootstrap a cryptographic key) that they can use to
establish secure communication links. Besides communicating with her friends,
a user ui also interacts with a set of contacts Ci to whom she is not connected in
the social network. Contacts are people that a user may wish to talk to, but does
not necessarily trust for relaying her connections (e.g., a relationship between a
patient and her doctor.) We consider that contacts exchange their pseudonyms
and establish a long term symmetric key offline (e.g., the patient meets the doctor
at the clinic.) Finally, we assume that relationships with friends are public, thus
known to the adversary (e.g., extracted from a social network web site [3],) but
that relationships with contacts are secret and must be concealed by Drac.
3.1 Establishing communications with Drac
Upon connection to the network, a user establishes low bandwidth bi-directional
heartbeat connections with each of her friends in order to make her availability
known to them. These connection are padded at a very low rate, and are used
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for signaling purposes (creating and extending connections, starting communi-
cations, etc,) as well as for establishing connections with the private presence
server (as explained in Sect. 3.2.) In Drac we strictly separate the control plane
from the data plane: signalling and presence packets are embedded and routed
in the heartbeat traffic such that an external observer cannot differentiate be-
tween dummy heartbeat packets and actual messages. Figure 1(left) shows the
heartbeat connections between six users {uA, . . . , uF } in which FA = {uC , uF },
FB = {uC , uE}, FC = {uA, uB , uD}, and so forth. By observing heartbeat con-
nections, an adversary does not gain extra knowledge about users, as the friend-
ships are considered public, and the timing and volume of heartbeat traffic does
not leak any further information.
Users wish to communicate with contacts, but they are not connected to
them in the network. For this purpose each ui has an entry point Ei that she
uses to indirectly establish communications. In each epoch users build a circuit
of depth D to their entry points (using their heartbeat channels.) We describe
the circuit creation process using the example network shown in Fig. 1:
1. User uA selects at random one of her friends to be the first hop of the circuit.
Say she chooses uC from FA = {uC , uF }. They establish a secure link using
their long-term key KAC , and generate a session key kAC .
2. uA requests uC to choose a friend at random and extend the circuit to her.
3. User uC selects a friend at random, say uD, and creates a new secure link
using KCD. Through the extended circuit, uA and uD establish a session
key kAD. As uC chooses one of her friends at random to route uA’s traffic,
it may be the case that uA is chosen to participate in her own circuit.
4. Steps 2 and 3 are iterated D times using friends of friends as next hops in the
path. The last user in the circuit is the entry point EA of uA. In the example
above, if D = 2, we say that uD is uA’s entry point EA. As members of the
circuit are chosen at random, uA may end up being her own entry point.
We note that uA needs to know her entry point to establish communications
with contacts, and thus EA needs to provide its identity to uA at the end of the
circuit creation process.
The circuit depth D is a security parameter of the system. Longer circuits in-
crease the anonymity provided by Drac as they make tracing communications to
their originator more difficult, while shorter circuits result in smaller anonymity
sets, as shown in Sect. 4. We consider that the adversary can observe all links,
and knows how many circuits are routed through each of them, but does not
know the correspondences between inputs and outputs at each node.
Friends communicate with each other through direct links. To ensure that
the communication is fully unobservable, both users still establish circuits of
depth D in the network, but at least one of them has to choose the other as
first hop. When a user ui with entry point Ei, wants to communicate with one
of her contacts uj with entry point Ej , she requests Ei to extend the circuit to
Ej . We call the connection between two entry points bridge, and denote it as
Bij . We note that bridges between users that are not friends are visible, as they
stand out with respect to the edges in the underlying social network, and the
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Fig. 1. Underlying social network and connection to the presence server (left.) Adver-
sary’s observation of an epoch (right.)
heartbeat channels that the adversary observes. If the entry points of ui and uj
are friends, an adversary can still observe that there is an extra circuit in the
system. However, she cannot distinguish this bridge from other links that are
part of a connection between a user and her entry point. Further, when Ei is
the same as Ej , no bridge is created and an adversary cannot detect that there
is a communication.
To ensure confidentiality of communications, ui and uj encrypt messages
using the keys that they share with each other, and with the nodes that they
use for transit. We denote by Ek(M) the encryption of message M under key k.
Upon receiving a message, an intermediate node processes it using the session
key shared with the originator of the message. After processing, the node checks
whether the message is addressed to itself. If the result is still a ciphertext the
message is relayed to the next node in the circuit, or dismissed at the last node.
Example. Let us consider that uX talks to uW through two of her friends
uY and uZ (which whom she shares session keys kXY and kXZ respectively,)
and two of uW ’s friends uU and uV (with whom uW shares kWU and kWV .) uX
and uW share a session key kXW that they create as explained in Sect. 3.2. The
route can be depicted as:
uX → uY → uZ ⇒ uU → uV → uW
where a bridge BXW has been created between uZ and uU .
If uX wishes to package a message M for uW she encrypts it under kXW ,
kXZ , and kXY , and sends:
uX → uY : EkXY (EkXZ (EkXW (M)))
The message gets relayed and decrypted by uY and uZ . User uZ sends to uU
EkXW (M) through the bridge BXW . Then, the message is encrypted under the
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keys of uU and uV . The following message arrives to uW :
uV → uW : EkWV (EkWU (EkXW (M)))
3.2 Private presence server
Users can establish communications with their friends or contacts, and thus
need to be reachable by them. To communicate with friends, users can use their
direct heartbeat channels. For initiating communications with a contact, we
require a private presence server that allows ui to be reachable by her contact
uj . The presence server is assumed to be cooperative (i.e., follows the protocols)
but untrustworthy (i.e., it could be colluding with the adversary in order to
deanonymize its users.) In our scheme, we draw some ideas from the Apres [20]
system, but we introduce several modifications in order to adapt it to the context
of Drac. For simplicity, we only consider one presence server in this work, but
we note that Drac could be trivially extended to support several servers.
Each user ui has a long term identifier IDi that is known by all her contacts,
but not by the presence server. We note that a user ui may have several IDs,
each corresponding to a circle of contacts, so that contacts belonging to differ-
ent “circles” cannot find out that they know the same user. In order to have
unlinkability between time periods and avoid long-term pseudonymous profiling
by the presence server, the identifier IDJi of ui in a given time period T is
computed as IDJi = H(T, IDi), where H(x, y) is an HMAC of x with key y. As
T is published by the presence server, ui and her contacts are able to compute
IDJi from her long term identifier IDi.
In order to be reachable by her contacts, ui creates a circuit of depth Dp (Dp
may or may not be equal to D) to her presence server PS using the heartbeat
channels. This presence circuit is built following the same procedure as the one
used to construct communication circuits from users to entry points. When the
connection is Dp hops long, ui instructs the last node, EPi , to send the IDJi
encrypted with the key of PS to PS. At this point, ui has an open connection
to her presence server, who can list IDJi as online.
In Fig. 1(left) we show the heartbeat connections in one epoch. These connec-
tions carry presence circuits that are unobservable to the attacker. For instance,
let us consider that the presence circuit from uA runs through users uF and
uE . An adversary can see the bridge between uE and PS, but cannot distin-
guish whether this connection comes from uA (through uA-uF -uE), uC (through
uC-uB-uE or uC-uD-uE), or uE (through uE-uB-uE , uE-uF -uE , or uE-uD-uE .)
Let us assume uB wants to communicate with her contact uA. First, uB
constructs a circuit to PS through the heartbeat channels in a similar way as
uA did to register her presence. We assume that uA and uB share a long-term
secret key KAB , and that they know each other’s long-term IDs (IDA and IDB .)
User uB creates a message for PS with the form:
EPKPS (IDJA, EKAB (EB , g
rB )) ,
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where PKPS is the public key of PS, KAB is the shared secret between uA
and uB , EB is the entry point of uB , and rB is a randomly generated number.
PS decrypts the message with its private key, and checks if a user with identifier
IDJA is connected. If this is the case, then it forwards EKAB (EB , g
rB ) through
the presence circuit of uA; otherwise, it ignores uB ’s request.
When uA gets the message from PS, she tries to decrypt it with all her
contact keys. When she identifies that the right key is the one corresponding
to uB , she retrieves the entry point EB of uB and g
rB . uA may now decide to
communicate with uB . We note that, if uA decides to ignore uB ’s request for
communication, uB does not know whether or not uA received the request, or
even whether she is online. Should uA be willing to talk to uB , she requests her
entry EA to prepare a bridge to EB for the next epoch. At the beginning of the
communication, uA sends the second part of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
grA , so that the conversation is encrypted with a session key kAB = g
rArB .
In order to preserve forward secrecy of requests for communications, uA and
uB update their shared key KAB . In this way, neither of them can be coerced
to decrypt an earlier intercepted message. The new key K ′AB is computed as:
K ′AB = H(kAB ,KAB).
There are some differences between Drac’s presence mechanism and Apres [20].
The most important one concerns the way ID’s are managed. In Apres, the ID’s
correspond to relationships (i.e., uA and uB share IDA+B ,) and when uA con-
nects to the presence server she provides all the ID’s she shares with her contacts,
plus some extra ones to prevent the server from identifying her by her number
of ID’s. The main disadvantage of this approach is that, even in the absence of
communications, the presence server can see the number of online user relation-
ships. Given a clustered group of contacts who are often online, the presence
server may be able to identify the relationships and link the identities between
epochs.
3.3 An epoch in Drac
Figure 1(right) shows the adversary’s observation of an epoch in which users
{uA, . . . , uF } are online in Drac using D = 2 (for simplicity, we denote user uX
as X in the reminder of this section.) We omit the connections to the presence
server in the figure for the purpose of this example. The communication circuits
(represented as - - -) created by the users are the following: A-C-D, B-C-B, C-
D-E, D-E-F, E-B-C, and F-E-B. The last node in each circuit is the entry point
of the initiator of the circuit, e.g., D is EA, the entry point of A. Besides, a
secure link (represented as ) has been created between every pair of nodes
that route a circuit. Note that there is no link between A and F, because no
circuit is relayed through them. However, the adversary can still observe the
heartbeat connection between them (represented as · · · .)
In the epoch shown in the figure two communications are taking place. First,
F and B are communicating. As both share the same entry point (EF=EB=B,)
no bridge is created and the communication is fully unobservable for the attacker.
A and D are having the second conversation, and they have created a bridge
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between their entry points EA=D and ED=F (represented as .) Although
this bridge is distinguishable by the attacker, it is not possible to determine from
the observation that A and D are the communication end points. For example, a
plausible alternative that would yield the same observation would be that there
is only one communication between D and F, and that the circuits are as follows:
A-C-D, B-C-D, C-B-C, D-E-F, E-B-E, and F-E-D.
By looking at the circuit connections, the adversary is not able to link users
with their entry points because they not only send messages through their own
circuit, but also act as “mixes” [6] relaying the traffic of others. Thus, when
several circuits traverse a node it is not possible for the adversary to distinguish
which input circuit corresponds to which output. As noted in the previous sec-
tion, all connections must be activated synchronously at the beginning of an
epoch. Otherwise, the adversary would see connections ripple down the network
when they are created and be able to link users with their entry points. Thus,
users must prepare connections in advance during the previous epoch, using the
heartbeat channels. For this they have to i) perform key exchanges with all nodes
in the circuit to their entry points, ii) find the entry points of the contacts with
whom they want to communicate, and iii) instruct their entry point to prepare
a bridge to their contact’s entry points. We note that this procedure requires
users to register their identities for the next epoch when they sign up in the
presence server. If two friends want to communicate, they do not need to find
their corresponding entry points, but just inform each other through their direct
heartbeat connection.
In this paper we restrict our analysis to one epoch, and leave the study of
the epoch duration’s impact on performance, usability, and security as a subject
of future work.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Experimental setup
In order to perform a preliminary analysis of the anonymity and unobservability
properties provided by Drac, we have implemented a software simulator.1 We
have tested three topologies for the network graph that describes how users
are connected to their friends: small-world networks [35], scale-free networks [2],
and random networks. We note that although these topologies do not necessarily
resemble real social networks, they are still of theoretical interest as they allow
us to study separately the effects of clustering and power law distributions on
the security properties of Drac. Experiments with real social network’s graphs
should be conducted in order to understand the level of protection offered by a
potential deployment of Drac.
The simulator generates networks of N nodes (users) with an average of
f edges (friends) selected according to the network topology, and f randomly
selected contacts. We simulate a single epoch per experiment. First we simulate
1 The code will be made available by the authors upon request.
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the epoch preparation phase, in which each user ui prepares a communication
circuit of depth D hops to her entry node Ei. In addition, users register at the
presence server through a heartbeat circuit of depth Dp. We denote the last
node in the presence circuit as EPi. We consider scenarios in which 10% of the
N users are communicating with contacts through bridges that connect their
respective entry nodes.
Second, we record the observation of the adversary after connections have
been activated in the beginning of the epoch. We recall that the adversary ob-
serves:
– The heartbeat connections between each pair of users ui and uj who share
a friendship relationship.
– The connections from the end of the presence circuits (i.e., from the entry
nodes EPi) to the presence server.
– The number of communication circuits routed between each pair of nodes ui
and uj , which is inferred by looking at the amount of bandwidth used.
– The bridge links Bij that connect the entry nodes Ei and Ej in a commu-
nication between two contacts ui and uj .
Given the observation of the adversary, in each experiment we randomly se-
lect a target user and compute her presence anonymity, communication anonymity,
and communication unobservability as described in the next three sections. The
results shown in the following sections combine samples from a thousand ex-
periments for each simulation scenario. The baseline simulation scenario is a
small-world network of 500 users, with 10 friends and 10 contacts each, and cir-
cuit depths D and Dp of three hops. These are the default parameters used in
the experiments unless indicated otherwise.
4.2 Anonymity towards the presence server
We first examine the anonymity provided by Drac towards the presence server.
Let us consider a user uA who registers at the presence server with pseudonym
IDJA in a given epoch. The presence server knows that IDJA corresponds to a
node that is connecting to it through a presence circuit of depth Dp, which is
routed over the heartbeat connections. The last node in this circuit is visible to
the presence server, and we denote it by EPA.
In addition, we assume that the adversary can see all the heartbeat connec-
tions in the network. We recall that, as explained in Sect. 3, heartbeat connec-
tions exist between any two users who share a friendship relationship, and that
heartbeat traffic is always the same regardless of whether one, several, or no
presence circuits are routed over the heartbeat connection.
Given this information, IDJA may correspond to any of the users ui con-
nected to EPA by Dp hops in the network of heartbeat channels. Let Pri[EPA]
be the probability that user ui is uA. We compute Pri[EPA] by enumerating all
possible circuits that start at EPA and lead to ui after Dp hops, taking into
account that nodes may appear several times in the paths. Let Pi be the total
number of such paths leading to ui, Pri[EPA] is computed as:
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Pri[EPA] =
Pi∑N
j=1 Pj
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
We compute the anonymity of uA towards the presence server as the entropy
HA of the distribution of Pri[EPA] over all users [11, 30].
HA = −
N∑
i=1
Pri[EPA] log2 Pri[EPA]
Figure 2(left) shows the anonymity of Drac towards the presence server for
small-world (SW), scale-free (SF), and random (R) networks of sizes between
N = 100 and N = 1000. The dashed horizontal line indicates the maximum
achievable anonymity for a network of size N , which is computed as log2N . The
‘x’ marks the median anonymity for 1000 experiments (each corresponding to
an independent target user,) and the vertical line traversing the ‘x’ indicates the
first and third quartiles of the distribution of anonymity results.
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Fig. 2. Anonymity towards the presence server, depending on the network size and
topology (left;) and on the depth of the circuits with the baseline parameters (right.)
As we can see in the figure, small-world network topologies provide the lowest
anonymity for any network size, and as the network grows their performance be-
comes worse compared to the other two topologies. This is due to the high degree
of clustering of small-world networks, which prevents Drac from taking full ad-
vantage of bigger networks: independently of the network size, uA’s connections
stay mostly in its own neighborhood. Random networks provide near-optimal
anonymity for small network sizes, but as the networks grow the best anonymity
performance is shown by scale-free networks. Scale-free networks show a power
law degree distribution and grow with preferential attachment. This implies that
these networks have some nodes with a very high degree, which grows with
the size of the network. High-degree nodes act as mixing hubs that increase
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anonymity. We choose small-world network topologies in the remaining simu-
lation scenarios in order to test Drac in the least favorable conditions (highly
clustered networks) and estimate a lower bound on the anonymity that it offers.
The critical security parameter of the Drac system is the depth of the circuits
– which is a system design parameter, as opposed to the network topology or the
average number of friends per user. As shown in Figure 2(right) longer presence
circuit depths increase the anonymity provided by Drac, at the cost of more com-
munication latency – as the messages need to travel more hops before reaching
their destination. In an real-world implementation of Drac, the depth parameter
Dp can be tuned to trade bandwidth, latency, and anonymity requirements for
any given network, as discussed in Section 5.
4.3 Contact communication anonymity
We recall that communications between friends are unobservable to the adver-
sary (see Sect. 3.1.) Let us consider that users uA and uF are contacts who are
communicating in a given epoch. We assume that the bridge connection BAF
between their respective entries, EA and EF , is observable to the adversary (i.e.,
we assume that EA and EF are not friends.) Note that this is a worst-case sce-
nario, as the bridge BAF may not be distinguishable to the adversary if EA and
EF are friends, and it is fully unobservable when both users share the same
entry; i.e., when EA = EF .
Starting from the fact that an observable bridge BAF evidences that two
contacts are communicating, we evaluate the anonymity of each of the two com-
municating users separately. This is done by analyzing which users may have
constructed a communication path ending, respectively, in entries EA and EF .
Note that this evaluation does not measure end-to-end anonymity. The reason
why it is not straightforward to compute end-to-end anonymity is because in
Drac the adversary does not have certainty that a given user is communicating,
as opposed to systems that do not use dummy traffic [8, 14, 29]. Information
theoretic anonymity metrics [11, 30] operate under the assumption that the ad-
versary knows that user uA is communicating, and then measure the uncertainty
of the adversary in identifying the other end of the communication (i.e., who talks
to whom.) In contrast, Drac provides communication unobservability properties,
implying that the adversary is not certain of who is talking in the first place.
The next section provides a preliminary analysis of unobservability in Drac. In
this section, we evaluate the anonymity of user uA with respect to an adversary
that observes the bridge at EA.
The analysis methodology is similar to the presence anonymity explained in
the previous section. The adversary explores all possible circuit paths of depth
D and records the frequency with which each user ui appears as initiator of the
candidate circuit that ends in EA. The main difference with the computation
of presence anonymity is that in this case the adversary can see the number
of circuits routed between each pair of nodes (by looking at the amount of
bandwidth used.)
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Figure 3 shows the results of our simulations for the contact communication
anonymity provided by Drac in various network conditions. The left-hand side
of the figure compares contact communication anonymity for small-world (SW),
scale-free (SF), and random networks (R), of N = 100 to N = 1000 users. We
can see that small-world networks provide the lowest anonymity, while scale-free
networks provide the best anonymity of the three topologies, for similar reasons
as pointed out in the previous section. We note the anonymity sets in this case are
smaller than for the presence circuits. The first factor reducing anonymity is that
the adversary has additional information with respect to presence – the number
of circuits per link. Another factor that reduces communication anonymity with
respect to presence anonymity is that communication links are more sparse than
heartbeat links. Users route on average D+1 communication circuits – regardless
of the size of the network and the average number of friends f – and several
circuits may be routed to the same friend. Thus, nodes will maintain fewer
communication links with friends than heartbeat connections – and at most, the
same.
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Fig. 3. Anonymity of contact communications towards a global passive adversary, de-
pending on the network size and topology (left;) and on the depth of the circuits with
the baseline parameters (right.)
For a constant circuit depth D, Drac provides more anonymity in bigger
networks (particularly for scale-free topologies.) We note though that the gap
grows between the achieved contact communication anonymity, and the maxi-
mum achievable (represented in the figure by dashed horizontal lines) – indicat-
ing that longer connection depth would be required to fully take advantage of
bigger networks.
In Figure 3(right) we show the variation of anonymity with the security
parameter D. As we can see, increasing the depth of the circuits can push the
contact communication anonymity of Drac arbitrarily close to the maximum
achievable (for a given network size.)
12
4.4 Contact communication unobservability
In this section we provide a preliminary analysis of the unobservability of com-
munications between contacts provided by Drac. In particular, we look at how
well the adversary can correctly guess whether or not user uA is communicating
with a contact.
Let C be the total number of contact communications taking place in a
given epoch, and let E be the set of entry nodes routing bridge connections for
those communications. If all communications create a bridge connection, then
|E| = 2C; if m pairs of communicating contacts share the same entry node, then
|E| = 2(C −m).
We denote by Pri[Ej ] the probability that ui is the user whose entry node is
Ej ∈ E . We compute Pri[Ej ] by enumerating all possible circuits that start at Ej
and lead to ui after D hops (note that
∑N
i=1 Pri[Ej ] = 1, but that
∑|E|
j=1 PrA[Ej ]
is not necessarily one.) The probability Pr[uA] that uA is one of the |E| users
communicating with a contact through any of the entry nodes in E is computed
as:
Pr[uA] =
∑|E|
j=1 PrA[Ej ]
∏|E|
k=1,k 6=j(1− PrA[Ek])∑|E|
j=1 PrA[Ej ]
∏|E|
k=1,k 6=j(1− PrA[Ek]) +
∏|E|
k=1(1− PrA[Ek])
We assume that the adversary knows the total number of contact communi-
cations C, and can correctly identify all bridge connections. We construct the
following test to compare Drac to an ideal system that provides perfect unob-
servability – in which the adversary’s best guess is to choose at random:
– First, the adversary computes Pr[ui] for all users ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
– The adversary constructs a set S with the 2C users with higher probabilities,
and another set R with 2C randomly chosen users. The set R models the
guess of the adversary for the ideal system.
– We randomly select a user uA who is communicating with a contact, and
we test if uA ∈ S, and if uA ∈ R. We repeat this experiment a thousand
times and compare the success rate of the Drac adversary with respect to
the success rate of ideal system’s (random) adversary.
– We perform the same experiment choosing a user uZ who is not communi-
cating, and compare the success rate of the adversaries of Drac and the ideal
system by testing the rate with which uZ ∈ S, and uZ ∈ R.
Figure 4 shows the results of our tests for a small-world network of 500
nodes in which there are C = 25 contact communications, each involving two
users. The left-hand side of the figure shows the results of our test for a user
uA who is communicating. As we can see, when connections have depth D = 1
the adversary is able to correctly guess that uA is communicating in more than
half of the experiments. When the depth increases to D = 4, the advantage of
the Drac adversary becomes negligible with respect to the adversary of the ideal
system (who guesses at random.)
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The right-hand side of the Figure 4 shows the results when testing a user
uZ who is not communicating. As in the previous case, the Drac adversary has
an advantage for small circuit depths D, but as D increases her success rate
becomes no better than random guessing.
1 2 3 4 50
10
20
30
40
50
60
Su
cc
es
s 
(%
)
Depth (D)
 
 
Drac attacker
Random attacker
1 2 3 4 50
10
20
30
40
50
60
Su
cc
es
s 
(%
)
Depth (D)
 
 
Drac attacker
Random attacker
Fig. 4. Comparison of Drac and random adversary success rate in determining that a
user is communicating, given that when 10% of the users are communicating. The left-
hand side shows the results for a user uA who is communicating, and the right-hand
side for a user uZ who is not communicating
5 Discussion
We have so far provided a high-level description of Drac. In this section we
discuss some specifics regarding real world performance, trade-offs, overheads
and details of the trust model.
Drac is designed to support real-time, low-volume communications such as
IM and controversially VoIP. What makes VoIP different from web-traffic is the
extreme predictability of the traffic of a VoIP call, despite the tighter require-
ments to make it useable. A mouth-to-ear delay of more than 50 ms makes voice
reflection annoying and a delay of more than 250 ms makes a two-way conver-
sation difficult. As an indication the free Speex2 codec allows for a sampling
rate of 8 kHz and a bit rate of 2.15 kbps (say 3 kbps to take into account some
cryptographic overhead). A compressed sample is generated for every 20 ms of
speech, with a look-ahead of 10 ms; i.e., 50 packets a second at a sampling rate
of 8 kHz, which corresponds to telephony quality. Each node in Drac needs to
establish two such channels (2 kpbs) one for incoming and one for outgoing voice,
relayed though multiple nodes. This bandwidth is well within the capabilities of
contemporary broadband connections, and a dedicated infrastructure could be
cheaply built using off-the-shelf routers to support large number of calls (e.g., for
2 http://www.speex.org
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a diplomatic network). Since VoIP is delay sensitive, it is reasonable for nodes
to discard packets that have been sitting in a queue for longer than 250 ms,
indicating that a UDP based implementation [28] would be preferable for Drac.
IM traffic has much less stringent requirements, with a couple of messages a
second being necessary, each only a few hundreds of bytes long.
As discussed in the evaluation section the length of the path of each circuit
is a key security parameter in Drac. This length is also the key contributor to
the overhead of the system: D + 1 hops per node would mean that the system
would consume N · (D + 1) · 2 · 3 kbps at any time, even if there are no calls in
progress (each node will be expected to carry (D + 1) · 2 · 3 kbps on average.)
Research suggests that denial-of-service attacks become more likely when paths
are longer [4], but the friend-of-a-friend topology used to route makes it less likely
that malicious nodes are present on any hop of short paths. Finally, although
in this paper we have assumed that D and Dp are constant for all users, there
might be some advantages in allowing users to specify their own circuit lengths,
as the adversary has to guess the length as well as the exact sequence of nodes
in the circuit.
The trust model used in Drac is one of the most novel, and controversial
design choices. We argue that relaying communications over a friend-of-a-friend
network provides some security advantages. First, it makes denial-of-service and
related attacks [4] less likely, and social defenses against sybil attacks can be
readily deployed [10]. Moreover, circuit creation does not require a centralized
directory and trust infrastructure, which favors network scalability. Drac also
avoids network discovery and random sampling attacks present in other peer-to-
peer designs [21]. Users have incentives to route traffic [1] for their friends, and
the relative stability of a social graph allows for tit-for-tat strategies to penalise
free-loading. Finally, the stability of the social graph also invalidates the models
of many traffic analysis attacks that assume anonymity sets to contain a random
selection of users alongside the target: filtering out the correlated “noise” from
those anonymity sets will be nuch more difficult under Drac.
On the down side, paths over social graphs need to be longer to achieve good
levels of anonymity, and the length depends on the mixing properties of the
social graph [7]. Finally, this design choice exposes the long term social network
of the user to the adversary: in many cases the purpose of an anonymity network
is hiding exactly those relationships. We have taken the view that long term
relations are doomed to be exposed through long term attacks [19]. We instead
opt to make those visible to better anonymize casual conversations with unusual
contacts. Despite the fact that a relation is visible, actual communication events
between friends are designed to be unobservable – a stronger guarantee than the
usual anonymity. These choices present a novel trust and protection profile in
the anonymity design space.
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6 Conclusions
Drac is the first system to be designed to withstand a global passive adversary to
protect instant messaging or voice-over-IP conversations. The low-volume and
regularity of such traffic makes the use of padding practical, compared with
padding high variance connections carrying web-traffic. The overhead of Drac
is still high, as users relay circuits over each other all the time. We argue that
for IM this overhead is still practical, since the original traffic volumes are low
to start with. For VoIP a broadband connection should suffice to participate in
Drac, following the current “volunteer” model of Tor [14]. For other deployments
a dedicated IP infrastructure could also be reasonable – as some high-profile
recent communication security failures illustrate, even some well funded state
level actors do not currently have a secure traffic analysis resistant diplomatic
network [33]. Our design for Drac could perfectly well fulfill that role.
The design of Drac also borrows features from peer-to-peer designs that sup-
press the distinction between users and infrastructure, with the novel twist of
using a friend-of-a-friend network as a communication and trust backbone. This
seriously limits the potential for sybil attacks, provides incentives for relaying
traffic, and leads to more stable anonymity sets. All these features require a re-
newed analysis of past attacks to incorporate them, but we are hopeful they will
present advantages over the traditional model of routing over a random graph.
Finally, Drac is fundamentally different from other designs regarding the se-
curity properties it provides: it reveals the social graph to the adversary, but
provides a stronger property – unobservability of communications. Anonymity
is provided when pseudonymous contacts have a conversation. This mixture
of properties is likely to be useful in different contexts from the traditional
anonymity properties that try to hide relationships against a partial adversary.
Our analysis of these properties, albeit preliminary, seems promising but many of
the definitions, attacks, and analysis frameworks in the literature will have to be
adapted to this new context. This work is a first contribution in this direction.
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